Amir Mohammad Emami; Abdolrasoul Kashfi
Volume 11, Issue 2 , December 2023, , Pages 139-168
Abstract
The problem of evil and its relation to theism is a significant philosophical issue that has been discussed from ancient times to the contemporary period. Bruce Reichenbach is one of the contemporary philosophers of religion who has studied the issue in its various aspects. He explores different accounts ...
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The problem of evil and its relation to theism is a significant philosophical issue that has been discussed from ancient times to the contemporary period. Bruce Reichenbach is one of the contemporary philosophers of religion who has studied the issue in its various aspects. He explores different accounts of the argument from the logical or deductive argument from evil to the evidential or probabilistic accounts. In response to the probabilistic argument from evil, he develops a theodicy of moral evils and a theodicy of natural evils. According to this theodicy of natural evils, called “Natural Laws Theodicy,” natural evils are necessary by-products of the operation of natural laws in the world. Reichenbach sees natural laws as necessary conditions of human freedom and moral agency, which are considered essential to account for moral evils in the world. The supposition used here is the superiority of worlds consisting of moral agents who act freely and produce a significant amount of moral good. In this way, Reichenbach’s theodicy of natural evils is based on his theodicy of moral evils. However, this theodicy faces a number of potential objections, which Reichenbach mentions as well. The severest challenge arises from the conceivability of worlds without natural evils or containing fewer natural evils in comparison with the current world. It might be argued that law-governed worlds that do not contain evils or contain fewer evils compared to the actual world are conceivable, and since conceivability entails possibility, such worlds are possible. Consequently, the Natural Laws Theodicy fails to explain the necessity of the natural evils in the actual world to achieve a greater good; namely, the possibility of moral agency and human freedom. While Reichenbach addresses this issue in brief, the aim of this paper is to explore the problem in more depth with due consideration to broader epistemic and metaphysical frameworks in contemporary philosophy. In this regard, David Chalmers’ view on conceivability and possibility is taken into account to assess the validity of the potential objection to the Natural Laws Theodicy and also Reichenbach’s response to it. Chalmers carefully explores various types of conceivability and their relation to different kinds of possibility in his criticism of materialism, which he does by arguing for dualism in the form of an argument from conceivability. In brief, he argues that conceivability comes in a variety of forms, including positive/negative, prima facie/ideal, and primary/secondary conceivabilities. From the combination of these types, there are totally more than eight types of conceivability in Chalmers’ view. Nevertheless, he believes that only specific types of conceivability entail the metaphysical possibility that is required for arguments about the ontological nature of the mind, for instance. In this research, Reichenbach’s theodicy is developed and his answer to the potential objection of the conceivability of worlds without evil, or worlds containing fewer evils compared to the actual world, is evaluated using Chalmers’ theory on the conditions of conceivability-possibility entailment. From the various types of conceivability that Chalmers identifies, it will be explored that the law-governed worlds without natural evils or worlds containing fewer evils compared to the actual world are in what sense if any, conceivable. In the next step, based on Chalmers’ accounts of conceivability-possibility entailment, it will be concluded if the possibility of such worlds could be validly deduced from their conceivability. Moreover, Reichenbach’s objections to the argument from the conceivability of law-governed worlds without natural evil will be assessed in accordance with Chalmers’ theory on the relation of conceivability to possibility. As the outcome, it will be demonstrated that some of Reichenbach’s solutions are not entirely plausible and do not succeed in defeating the argument as they do not meet the standards set by Chalmers. Nevertheless, some of his other objections could be developed using the same framework to defeat the argument but in a weaker sense. Consequently, Bruce Reichenbach’s Theodicy of Natural Laws could be partially defended against the challenge of the conceivability of law-governed worlds without natural evils by the conditions of conceivability-possibility entailment set by David Chalmers. This research sets the ground for further research on this theodicy and similar ones that in one way or another relate to the issue of arguing from conceivability to possibility. It opens up the opportunity to take into account theories developed by Chalmers as well as other contemporary philosophers and metaphysicians who have explored different dimensions of the subject to give the investigations regarding the problem of evil and other issues in philosophy of religion more depth and precision.
